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Constructs of Justice:  
Beyond Civil Litigation
Alan J. Tomkins and Kimberly Applequist
I t is the case that civil justice problems constitute the bulk of courts’ work in both the state and federal legal systems (see, e.g., Court Statistics Project, 2006; 
U.S. Courts, 2007). Nevertheless, a decision rendered by a jury (or a judge) takes 
place in only a relatively small percentage of civil disputes. There are exponen-
tially more civil disputes resolved outside of court than are resolved via jury 
verdicts (see, e.g., Galanter, 1983, 1993, 1996; Miller & Sarat, 1980–1981; Trubek, 
Grossman, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Sarat, 1983), a state of affairs true for the UK as 
well as the US (Pleasence, 2006). Hersch’s (2006) analysis of nearly 3,800 federal 
civil cases shows even a litigant’s request for a jury trial rather than a bench trial 
(regardless of whether it emanates from the plaintiff or the defendant) in trial-el-
igible cases is more likely to result in the parties’ out-of-court settlement than it is 
to result in a jury verdict. 
The empirical reality, thus, is that juries play only a limited—it is fair to say, 
a relatively minor—role in civil dispute resolution. Yet jury research has domi-
nated the scholarship of the psychology and law community virtually since the 
revival of psycholegal research in the 1970s, and the pattern of focusing on jury 
matters continues today. This chapter is a call for psycholegal scholars to study 
civil justice matters beyond the context of litigation and the courts, both to allow 
us to better understand the resolution of civil issues in the litigation/court con-
texts and to better understand the larger institutional (and sometimes societal) 
contexts in which civil disputes materialize and are most often resolved (see Fel-
stiner, Abel, & Sarat, 1980–1981; Galanter, 1983, 1993, 1996; Kritzer, Vidmar, & 
Bogart, 1991; Trubek et al., 1984; Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman, 
1983). 
An area of psycholegal research that has provided significant insights into 
civil disputes is the different conceptualizations of ‘‘justice.’’ Over the last fifty 
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years or so, there has been a great deal of commentary and research into various 
psychosocial constructs of justice. In this chapter we focus on the more prominent 
justice theories, that is, distributive, procedural, restorative, and retributive jus-
tice (e.g., Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997).1 
Briefly, distributive justice is concerned primarily with the perceived fair-
ness of the outcome of a given proceeding, whether that proceeding is judicial, 
quasi-judicial (e.g., arbitration, mediation, or some other form of dispute res-
olution), or entirely non-judicial in nature (e.g., legislative decisions that af-
fect distribution of resources). Procedural justice, in contrast, is concerned with 
whether the procedures used in a given process are considered fair by the par-
ticipants, and is similarly not restricted to judicial settings. Restorative justice 
is concerned, as the name implies, with restoring an injured party to his or her 
pre-injury state and helping the injuring party recognize and redress the injuri-
ous nature of his or her acts. Finally, retributive justice looks at the psychology 
of responding to harms that have been inflicted. Recent research indicates that 
retributive and restorative justice principles are, as with the distributive and 
procedural justice contexts, applicable outside the judicial context (e.g., Morri-
son & Ahmed, 2006). 
More thorough reviews of justice concepts are offered elsewhere in this vol-
ume (see, e.g., Greene’s chapter on therapeutic and restorative justice and Rob-
bennolt’s chapter on apologies; for particularly useful analyses of the psycholog-
ical dimensions of justice, see the scholarship of Tom Tyler—e.g., Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Tyler, 1994b; Tyler et al., 1997). In this chapter, we will briefly discuss jus-
tice constructs and offer examples of important questions outside the courtroom 
litigation realm that we believe present opportunities for psycholegal scholars to 
more fully develop our understanding of civil justice. 
Distributive Justice 
Early research into theories of justice focused primarily upon the perceived 
fairness of the outcome of a dispute or allocation process as the primary factor 
influencing a party’s satisfaction with the proceedings. This focus evolved from 
the notion that people would primarily be concerned with the fairness of the out-
comes they received (or were burdened with), though thinking of distributive 
justice as merely defined by ‘‘what’s in it for me’’ would be missing the point. 
Rather, it is more accurate to characterize distributive justice as being primarily 
1 There is some disagreement about whether additional justice constructs ought to be in-
cluded among the ‘‘prominent’’ justice theories. For example, Weinrib (2002) writes 
about corrective justice, referring to ‘‘the idea that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted 
by one person on another’’ (p. 349). There are even disagreements about the precise tax-
onomy of the various justice constructs as well as the numbers, their boundaries, etc. For 
purposes of this chapter, we rely on the constructs of justice used by Tom Tyler, by far 
the most prolific and important of modern justice scholars, and his colleagues in their 
book, Social Justice in a Diverse Society (1997). 
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concerned with the appropriate distribution of costs and benefits within a soci-
ety, and the principles that people believe ought to influence and determine such 
distributions. 
Deutsch (1985) points out that although the concept of distributive justice is 
quite old, going back at least as far as Aristotle, theoretical and experimental so-
cial psychology only began to seriously consider justice issues about a half-cen-
tury ago as an extension of equity theory (e.g., Adams, 1965; Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959; see generally, Lerner, 1975; Lerner & Lerner, 1981; Walster, Walster, & Ber-
scheid, 1978). In the past few decades, distributive justice has been studied fre-
quently in the context of the legal system. Although manifestly applicable in lit-
igation contexts (who wins, who loses, and how do the parties feel about the 
fairness of the outcomes?), it is equally relevant to the allocation of resources in 
other societal contexts as well, ranging from political theory and policy to educa-
tion, business and other similar areas. 
John Rawls, a philosopher, has developed some of the most influential ideas 
about distributive justice. In his 1971 treatise, A Theory of Justice, Rawls explored 
principles of justice using the concept of a ‘‘veil of ignorance.’’ According to 
Rawls, the fairest principles that could be chosen for a society would be the ones 
its members would choose if it were not possible for them to know in advance 
what role they would occupy within that society (Hegtvedt & Cook, 2001). Such 
principles, Rawls theorized, would focus on ‘‘impartial behavior and fairness in 
the distribution of social benefits and burdens’’ (Michelbach, Scott, Matland, & 
Bornstein, 2003, p. 523)—thus the term distributive justice. 
There are several principles that influence opinions about what constitutes 
fairness of outcome, and they may have different relative importance depend-
ing upon the situation in question and the parties involved. Michelbach et al. 
(2003) identify four key allocation concepts that consistently appear in the re-
search literature: ‘‘equality, efficiency, need, and merit’’ (p. 524, emphasis in orig-
inal), although some authors focus on only three principles: equity (roughly the 
equivalent of efficiency as described by Michelbach et al., below), equality and 
need (e.g., Hegtvedt & Cook, 2001). All four concepts noted by Michelbach et al. 
are specifically identified in Rawls’ early work. Equality has been defined in a 
number of ways, and there is significant disagreement regarding what, exactly, 
it means. Definitions vary from ‘‘absolute equality of income’’ (Michelbach et 
al., p. 524, citing Rawls, 1971) to more general conceptualizations like equal-
ity of opportunity or similar compensation for similar levels of effort. Efficiency 
(or equity) constitutes a departure from absolute equality to an unequal distri-
bution of resources motivated by increased overall productivity (Michelbach et 
al., p. 524). Need refers, as the name implies, to access (or lack thereof) to the es-
sentials of life, and merit (sometimes called desert or proportionality) refers to in-
herent qualities like intelligence, beauty, and willingness to work hard (Michel-
bach et al., pp. 524–525). Interestingly, Rawls and others argue merit should not 
be a basis for distribution of resources, though many others disagree (Michel-
bach et al., p. 525). 
These four concepts, applied individually, might well lead to different out-
comes in any given situation. For example, equality might require an even dis-
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tribution of resources among competing parties, while a need-based allocation 
might result in a previously disadvantaged party receiving a larger share of the 
resources, and an efficiency-based allocation might call for distributing a larger 
share to those parties that produce the most. In a given situation, then, how might 
one decide which principle(s) should be applied to make an appropriate alloca-
tion determination? There is, perhaps not surprisingly, some dispute about this. 
Rawls himself felt that the principles apply in some sort of orderly hierarchy, but 
others have argued that people may use most or all of the principles to some de-
gree, depending on the given situation (Scott, Matland, Michelbach, & Bornstein, 
2001). Research in the area of distributive justice also suggests that there may be 
differences in priority for people of different demographic groups. Gender, race/
ethnicity, and cultural background can all affect distribution prioritization (Mi-
chelbach et al., 2003; Scott et al., 2001), as can cognitive processes such as attribu-
tions (Hegtvedt & Cook, 2001). 
Given the principles that appear to be at work in the distributive justice con-
struct, then, it is not difficult to see how research in this area could tell us much 
not only about civil justice in courtroom settings, but also about legislative de-
cisions that regulate courtroom outcomes (e.g., should there be caps placed on 
medical malpractice awards?) or allocate resources directly (e.g., through regu-
lations or restrictions that limit agricultural water use to protect the water rights 
of downstream water users). Distributive justice principles would be particularly 
valuable to examine public satisfaction with administrative agency decision-mak-
ing, which regulates so much activity in American society, particularly with re-
spect to the allocation or distribution of resources (e.g., Helm, 2001; Rubin, 2005; 
Suk, 2006). 
Procedural Justice 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, distributive justice principles are often less 
important to disputants than other factors when individuals are asked to evalu-
ate their overall satisfaction with the resolution of some dispute or resource allo-
cation. In many instances, procedural justice principles carry greater weight than 
distributive outcome measures like equity or equality in determining the overall 
level of satisfaction for parties to a dispute. In other words, individuals who view 
the dispute resolution process (whether that process involves a criminal or civil 
trial, arbitration or mediation, or some less formal dispute resolution mechanism) 
as fair are often more willing to accept outcomes that are objectively less equal or 
equitable. 
Starting with early research by John Thibaut, a social psychologist, and Lau-
rens Walker, a law professor, into procedural justice, the role of perceptions of 
procedural justice has been and continues to be a major focus for psycholegal re-
searchers (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978; see generally, Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler 
& Lind, 2001). Indeed, research into the interactive roles of procedural and dis-
tributive justice indicates that a sense of procedural justice is usually more impor-
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tant than a sense of distributive justice in determining whether an outcome or 
distribution allocation is likely to be accepted by the parties to a dispute (Tyler, 
2000; Tyler et al., 1997). 
Procedural justice, as the name implies, focuses on whether the procedures 
used to make an allocation determination are fair, without regard to the ac-
tual outcome. Tyler (1991) identifies four key factors that individuals weigh 
when determining whether a proceeding is procedurally fair: fairness and neu-
trality of the decision maker; opportunity to present one’s side of the dispute 
(also called voice); trustworthiness (as opposed to mere neutrality) of the de-
cision maker; and respectful treatment of all parties during the course of the 
proceedings. 
Perhaps least surprising among the four components of procedural justice 
is the requirement that the decision maker be perceived as neutral. Although it 
might seem reasonable that one would prefer to have a dispute heard by a judge 
known to be biased in favor of the claimant’s position,2 it is also the case that no 
one would want to have a matter resolved by a decision maker known to be bi-
ased against the claimant. Thus, it is important that the decision maker be per-
ceived as neutral by all parties to a dispute in order to prevent either party from 
feeling that justice has suffered due to the decision maker’s bias. 
As important as the neutrality of the decision maker is the opportunity to 
present one’s side of the dispute in front of that neutral decision maker. Re-
search indicates that the opportunity to voice one’s position is critical to the 
overall perception of procedural justice. Indeed, there are reports of instances 
where even though a party has received everything sought in a dispute, he or 
she nevertheless reports frustration with the proceedings due to the denial of 
the opportunity to fully tell his or her story. Tyler (1988) reports defendants’ 
dissatisfaction with a traffic court judge who routinely dismissed the tickets of 
those who appeared in court to contest them. The judge reasoned that if the de-
fendants had taken the time off their jobs to come to court to fight the matter, 
they had been sufficiently punished for whatever infraction they might have 
been charged with. Although the outcome manifestly favored those who con-
tested their traffic tickets, the defendants frequently reported that they felt frus-
trated with the outcome because they were not given the opportunity to present 
their case before the decision was rendered. Many of them had gone to some 
lengths to prepare their case–taking pictures of the scene or arranging wit-
nesses—only to have all charges dropped before they could tell their side of the 
story. Despite the positive distributive outcome, they were disturbed by the fact 
that their voice was not heard. 
Related but not identical to the neutrality of the decision maker is his, her, or 
their trustworthiness. A biased decision maker by definition will not be deemed 
trustworthy by all parties to a dispute, but neutrality does not guarantee trust-
2 Indeed, this common sentiment is the inspiration behind a t-shirt that is popular among 
litigators, which reads, ‘‘A good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the judge.’’ 
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worthiness. Rather, the decision maker must be an individual or group whom the 
parties believe will apply any relevant laws, rules, or other decision-making prin-
ciples in an appropriate and consistent manner to oversee the proceedings and 
arrive at his, her, or their decision(s). Trustworthiness also has implications for 
legitimacy in governmental actions (Tyler, 2000; Tyler et al., 1997; see generally, 
Cross, 2005). 
Respectful treatment is at least partially related to, yet distinct from, the other 
factors that comprise procedural justice. Giving the parties the opportunity to 
voice their concerns and stories can indicate respect for the parties. Similarly, an 
open display of neutrality can convey the message that one has sufficient respect 
for all parties to withhold judgment until the facts of the matter have been heard. 
Yet respectful treatment also includes such simple factors as courteous treatment 
and an absence of sarcasm or harsh or inappropriate criticism over the course of 
dispute resolution proceedings. 
Often, the presence of sufficient evidence of procedural justice can overcome 
a lack of distributive justice in the outcome of a given proceedings, leaving los-
ing participants nevertheless willing to accept the outcome of the process (e.g., 
Lind & Tyler, 1988). Interestingly, perceptions of a lack of procedural justice can 
cause parties to be dissatisfied with a proceeding even when the outcome of the 
proceeding is in their favor. Tyler’s example of the traffic court judge cited previ-
ously is just one example of this paradoxical effect. 
The potency of procedural justice constructs for understanding partici-
pant perceptions in civil disputes goes beyond litigation contexts. For example, 
Markell (2006) argues that procedural justice provides a framework that allows 
researchers and others to anticipate and understand citizen satisfaction with and 
attributions of legitimacy to international administrative actions in environmen-
tal policymaking and decision-making domains under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Procedural justice also makes a difference in partici-
pant perceptions in such civil justice areas as commitment hearings (Tyler, 1992), 
affirmative action (Tyler, 2004), and compliance with intellectual property laws 
(Tyler, 1997a). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) show that procedural justice principles 
help confer legitimacy upon government actions, in this instance the legitimacy 
of the police in New York (see generally, Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001; Tyler, 
1997b, 2006, 2007; Tyler & Darley, 2000). 
Retributive and Restorative Justice 
Retributive justice is focused on whether there should be sanctions for those 
who break rules; if sanctions are imposed, which ones are appropriate in light 
of the circumstances; and how severe the sanctions imposed should be (e.g., Ty-
ler, Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 1997; Tyler et al., 1997, chap. 5). Sanctions can in-
clude compensation to one’s victim as well as punishment of the transgressor as a 
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means of restoring that which has been disrupted by a dispute, rule-breaking, or 
other transgression (e.g., Brickman, 1977; Shultz & Darley, 1991). 
The concept and theory of restorative justice, sometimes alternatively de-
scribed as therapeutic justice or victim-offender mediation, is relatively new, though 
many of the procedures it generally utilizes are actually quite old. It has gained 
significant popularity in the context of relatively minor crimes, particularly when 
such crimes are committed by youthful offenders. Restorative justice generally 
involves bringing the victim of the crime (or other injury) and/or his or her fam-
ily together with the offender (and perhaps the offender’s family or other com-
munity members, depending upon the age of the offender and the nature of the 
offense). The parties meet in a supportive setting that allows the victim to express 
how he or she has been affected by the offender’s acts and be involved in deter-
mining appropriate punishment or restitution, and allows the offender to be held 
directly accountable to his or her victim (Umbreit & Ritter, 2006). The hope of re-
storative justice proponents is that such proceedings ultimately produce greater 
satisfaction among all the parties involved than traditional judicial proceedings 
would, and that they will decrease the likelihood of future wrongdoing by the 
offender. 
The restorative justice movement arose in response to traditional criminal jus-
tice methods, which historically focused on determining whether an offender has 
violated a statute and meting out appropriate punishment for such a violation, 
usually in the form of incarceration or fines, without regard to whether such pro-
ceedings were adequate to help make the victim(s) of the offender’s crimes whole 
again. Indeed, as noted by Umbreit, Vos, Coates, and Lightfoot (2006): 
Most contemporary criminal justice systems focus on law violation, 
the need to hold offenders accountable and punish them, and other 
state interests. Actual crime victims are quite subsidiary to the pro-
cess and generally have no legal standing in the proceedings. Crime 
is viewed as having been committed against the state, which, there-
fore, essentially owns the conflict and determines how to respond to 
it. The resulting criminal justice system is almost entirely offender 
driven (p. 253). 
The process is thus often highly unsatisfactory to the offender’s victims, 
who may feel ignored or undervalued by the process, as if they were merely 
bystanders to the process of justice. It may also produce less than ideal results 
for offenders by focusing on punishment rather than healing the damage they 
caused, denying them the opportunity to understand the ramifications of and 
make restitution for their past actions (Gray-Kanatiiosh & Lauderdale, 2006; 
Roche, 2006). 
As part of their in-depth analysis of a restorative justice dialogue that arose 
from the robbing of an Israeli woman by two Palestinian boys, Umbreit and Rit-
ter (2006) articulate six elements to a restorative justice dialogue. First, everyone 
who was directly affected by the crime should be encouraged to participate in 
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the dialogue. Second, the victim and the offender should be able to choose family 
members and/or support persons to be present, if they desire. 
Third, critically, participation in the dialogue must be voluntary by all parties. 
Fourth, the process of the dialogue should be adapted to the needs of both the 
victim and the offender. Fifth, extra deference should be shown to the victim, but 
the offender should still be treated with respect. And sixth, all of the primary par-
ties to the dialogue should be prepared in advance through in-person meetings 
with some mediator/facilitator prior to the dialogue. 
While the concept of restorative justice is relatively new to American courts, 
similar principles can be found in many traditional or historical societies. Gray-
Kanatiiosh and Lauderdale (2006) discuss the use of restorative principles in 
Native American societies as a way of maintaining balance within the society. 
They argue that, rather than exerting control through ‘‘stricter laws, more law 
enforcement officers, and increased funding’’ as a way to decrease crime in Na-
tive American communities, the money would be better spent restoring ‘‘a mul-
tidimensional ‘web of justice’ by identifying, understanding and, where possible, 
re-creating traditional cultural social practices and structures to maintain social 
balance, diversity, and harmony within their societies’’ (pp. 29–30). The ‘‘web of 
justice’’ they describe includes ‘‘preventative as well as restorative mechanisms 
that together function to maintain justice, at least justice as fairness’’ (p. 30, empha-
sis added). 
More recent research in the area of restorative justice has expanded from the 
criminal law context to applying the principles of restorative justice in other ar-
eas (e.g., Tyler, 2006; see generally, Morrison & Ahmed, 2006). One such area is 
that of civil litigation. Civil litigation, and more particularly tort litigation, is gen-
erally intended to redress some injury that results from the intentional or negli-
gent acts or omissions of another. Such cases can range from the deliberate injury 
of one person by another (e.g., battery or libel), to medical malpractice, to the no-
torious slip-and-fall case (negligence). Similarly, in breach of contract litigation, 
a party generally alleges that it has been injured due to the other party’s failure 
to perform under the terms of the contract, entitling the non-breaching party to 
damages or other equitable relief. In both types of lawsuit, the injured party sues 
in order to be made whole for his or her injury. Yet, is the civil litigation process, 
with its monetary verdicts, the best recompense for an injury? 
Greene’s chapter (Ch. 12) in this volume [B. H. Bornstein et al. (eds.), Civil 
Juries and Civil Justice (Springer, 2008)] is an example of the application of re-
storative justice in the civil justice arena. As Greene points out, the civil liti-
gation experience can be very unpleasant for all the participants, and can 
ultimately leave even successful litigants feeling unsatisfied. This lack of sat-
isfaction may stem from a number of factors, including the length of time re-
quired for the process, its costs—which include time away from work or loved 
ones and emotional toll in addition to legal fees and court costs—and various 
other frustrations. 
Greene explores the therapeutic—and especially the counter-therapeutic—ef-
fects of litigation. Drawing on procedural justice theory, she argues both plaintiffs 
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and defendants in tort litigation may gain some measure of satisfaction from be-
ing able to voice their side of the story and from being treated fairly and respect-
fully. On the other hand, the lengthy and often acrimonious process of litigation, 
which may stretch out for a considerable period of time and usually results at 
most in the exchange of monetary compensation, often without the actual dis-
pute being heard by the court (i.e., when the parties settle), may actually have a 
counter-therapeutic effect in terms of prolonging the suffering of both parties and 
worsening the physical and mental health and well-being of the injured party (or 
at least slowing his or her full recovery). It is for these reasons that Greene ar-
gues for adoption of a restorative justice approach to tort litigation, as its empha-
sis is upon speedy resolution to disputes and providing the parties an opportu-
nity to talk through the injury and its impacts and explain their respective sides 
of the story. The hope is that by encouraging out-of-court resolution, the parties 
will find it more satisfying and allow them to move past the dispute or incident 
that led to the initial conflict. 
Rather than focusing strictly on restorative justice, Robbennolt in her chap-
ter (Ch. 11) in this volume examines the effects of apologies in a civil litigation 
context. While apologies can have a therapeutic effect for both an injured party 
and the wrongdoing party, they are often viewed as counter to the interests of 
the wrongdoing party, as they may be or appear to be an admission of wrong-
doing and responsibility, which may affect the wrongdoing party’s financial lia-
bility if the matter is brought to trial (i.e., in tort litigation) (see, e.g., Vines, 2007). 
Robbennolt delves into the research surrounding the practical effects of apologies 
and the different effects of true apologies that accept responsibility and express 
remorse versus mere expressions of sympathy, all in terms of an injured party’s 
likelihood of filing a lawsuit or accepting a settlement offer, and in terms of jury 
perceptions about the wrongdoing party’s guilt and financial liability to the in-
jured party. Her work (see especially, Robbennolt, 2003, 2005, 2006) in this regard 
is admirably thorough and provides helpful guidance for future research into the 
therapeutic values of apologies and their effects in the dispute resolution process 
both inside and outside the courtroom. 
Justice Principles Outside the Courtroom 
The chapters by Greene and by Robbennolt are examples of psycholegal 
scholarship that examines justice notions inside the context of courts and liti-
gation and also goes beyond this narrow bandwidth of disputes. Disputes may 
be resolved, for example, through quasi-legal proceedings such as arbitration 
or mediation, either by being referred to such proceedings by a court, by virtue 
of contract provisions requiring that disputes be resolved, at least in the initial 
stages, through such proceedings, or by the mutual agreement of the parties, 
who may prefer the speedier and usually less expensive alternatives of arbi-
tration or mediation to formal litigation. In such proceedings, the applicability 
of the justice constructs described in this chapter are clearly analogous to for-
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mal courtroom proceedings, with arbitration in particular resembling court tri-
als and mediation more closely paralleling the sort of proceeding seen in restor-
ative justice contexts. 
In addition, theories of justice may have applicability in areas that seem fur-
ther outside the dispute resolution process. In ordinary day-to-day affairs, dis-
putes of all sorts arise which may be handled solely by the parties involved or 
by the parties appealing to some other person to help resolve the dispute. Cor-
porations make internal decisions about resource allocation, among competing 
programs or internal departments; governmental entities make decisions that af-
fect public health or welfare or require the allocation of resources in a manner 
that will be accepted by their constituents; health care organizations and insurers 
make decisions that involve the allocation of scarce healthcare resources, and pa-
tients or physicians may seek to appeal those decisions through internal appeal 
mechanisms within the healthcare organization or health insurer; and friends or 
family members may argue about any number of decisions and seek help resolv-
ing the dispute from therapists or other friends or relatives. The satisfaction of the 
parties with the outcomes of such disputes may be influenced by the same justice 
principles seen at work in formal legal proceedings. 
For example, in areas such as health care, we can see the application of civil 
justice principles in an extremely important domain that resides mostly outside 
of the litigation and courtroom contexts. Extensive research has been done into 
the applicability of justice principles, particularly procedural and distributive 
justice, in the health care context. Daniels (2001), for example, relies on distrib-
utive and procedural justice principles in his examination of inequities in the 
healthcare system. Among other things, he concludes that distributive justice 
principles require protection and maintenance of proper health functioning, in 
that protection of health also protects the individual’s ‘‘fair share of the normal 
range of opportunities (or plans of life) reasonable people would choose in so-
ciety’’ (p. 3). However, he argues, since societies have resource constraints, pre-
venting unfettered access to healthcare by all, societies must find a way to meet 
healthcare needs fairly given such constraints. He argues societies must ‘‘rely 
on a fair process for arriving at solutions to these problems and for establish-
ing the legitimacy of rationing decisions’’ (p. 9, citing Rawls, 1971). Such proce-
dures should be tied to ‘‘deliberative democratic procedures’’ (p. 9). Also in the 
healthcare arena, but in contrast to Daniels, Elster (1995) focused on the appli-
cation of distributive justice principles on allocative decision-making in the con-
text of organ transplantation. At any given time, there are huge numbers of peo-
ple awaiting organ transplants, yet only a limited number of organs availability 
for transplantation. Decisions about who should receive organ transplants are 
constrained or influenced by various factors, including tissue compatibility, 
likelihood of organ rejection, likely lifespan of a patient if transplantation is suc-
cessful, and urgency of a given recipient’s need or likely level of improvement 
if the patient receives the transplant. In any given decision, where two recipi-
ents might have identical probability of successful transplantation (e.g., equal 
tissue compatibility and probability of transplant success), giving preference to 
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one of the factors over another might lead to a different allocation decision than 
giving preference to the other factor(s). Often in such situations, doctors will 
choose to give the transplant to the sicker patient, viewing that patient as hav-
ing the greater need (thus implicating the distributive justice principle of using 
need as a determining factor in just allocation decisions), but Elster argued that 
some measure of consideration should also be given to the likely level of bene-
fit the competing patients would receive, introducing and efficiency component 
to the distributive justice process of allocation determinations. Furthermore, as 
Elster notes, often the patient’s poor health and need for organ transplantation 
are ‘‘the predictable outcome of earlier behavior’’ (p. 8). For example, an alco-
holic or drug abuser might so damage his or her liver functioning as to require 
a liver transplant to restore healthy functioning. In such cases, Elster argues, 
it might be better or more efficient, from a societal perspective, to give prefer-
ence to a competing patient who requires the transplant due to illness or dam-
age from some prescribed medication, because it provides more incentive for 
people not to engage in detrimental behaviors if they know that society will not 
bail them out from the consequences of that behavior. 
In addition to his examination of the role of justice principles in the context of 
organ transplantation, Elster (1995) also reviewed their applicability in the alloca-
tion of educational resources, focusing on admission to higher education. Again, 
this is a form of decision making between competing interests that ordinarily falls 
outside of the litigation context (barring the occasional lawsuit brought by some-
one who is denied admission in favor of other objectively similarly-qualified ap-
plicants) that implicates distributive and perhaps procedural justice principles. 
Often college admission decisions are based primarily on merit, which may or 
may not be one of the distributive justice principles (as discussed elsewhere in 
this chapter), though frequently some consideration is made with respect to a 
candidate’s relative need, particularly when decisions are made regarding schol-
arships or other forms of financial support for higher education—again, raising 
a distributive justice principle. Yet by definition, basing decisions upon merit or 
need is not providing equality of educational opportunity to all college appli-
cants, bringing the process into conflict with another distributive justice princi-
ple. Furthermore, basing a decision primarily upon merit, which may arise in part 
due to unequal environments and unremedied needs earlier in life, also brings 
the admissions process into conflict with the distributive justice principle of need 
as well as equality. 
Justice principles also come into play in connection with public acceptance 
of governmental decision-making. Arvai (2003) found that when members of 
the public were told that a governmental decision had been made with pub-
lic participation, they were more likely to approve of the actual decision, a find-
ing that is consistent with Tyler’s views of the intersection between procedural 
justice and legitimacy of governmental decision-making (e.g., Tyler, 2000, 2006; 
Tyler & Darley, 2000). Arvai’s study looked at public reactions to a governmen-
tal decision in the context of a risk communication by the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 
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with regard to a space mission. One central issue in the risk communication 
was the decision by mission planners to include generators containing approx-
imately 33 kilograms of plutonium for generating spacecraft electricity. The de-
cision was considered a controversial one due to the dangerous nature of the ra-
dioactive fuel when it appeared that other non-nuclear options were available, 
and while NASA and the JPL took several steps to help minimize the risk to ci-
vilians and the environment, there was considerable protest in the time leading 
up to the mission launch. 
The Arvai study provided participants with one of two sets of documents de-
scribing the mission. Both documents included language developed by NASA 
and JPL to discuss the risk of the nuclear fuel on the mission. However, one ver-
sion of the fact sheet indicated that the decision had involved ‘‘joint discussions 
and careful planning among experts in the North American and European space 
program,’’ while the other included the following language: 
Planning for this mission was one of the firsts of its kind to involve 
active participation from the public as well as experts. All of the 
parties, expert and public alike, involved in mission planning were 
treated equally by the International Space Consortium in terms of 
their values and objectives for a safe and productive mission (p. 
283). 
Participants were asked to respond to a variety of questions, some of which 
were designed to assess their opinions about both the decision to proceed with 
the space mission (decision-making outcome) and the process used to arrive at 
that decision and whether that process made them more or less likely to support 
the overall decision. Participants were more likely to support the mission in the 
public involvement condition than in the expert-only condition. Similarly, partici-
pants were more satisfied with the decision-making process in the public involve-
ment condition than in the expert-only condition. The author concluded that the 
use of participatory decision-making processes—that is, those that provide an 
opportunity for public voice, a procedural justice concern—conferred greater le-
gitimacy upon governmental decisions than an expert-only decision-making 
process. 
In another study examining the effects of justice constructs outside of the 
courtroom context, Hopkins and Weathington (2006) recently looked at the influ-
ence of distributive and procedural justice principles and their interaction, along 
with other factors, in downsizing situations in the corporate workplace. Their re-
search focused on the survivors of the downsizing—that is, those who remained 
employed at the workplace following a round of layoffs. Noting earlier research 
by McFarlin and Sweeny (1992), which had concluded that employee perceptions 
of procedural justice in the workplace were a predictor of organizational commit-
ment and trust in the organization, Hopkins and Weathington found significant 
relationships between both distributive justice and procedural justice, coupled 
with trust, on the one hand, and factors like organizational satisfaction, affective 
commitment, and turnover intentions (i.e., intent to seek employment elsewhere), 
on the other hand. 
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Conclusion 
Decisions made between competing parties and among various options are a 
daily fact of life across the societal spectrum: Businesses decide which projects to 
allocate resources to, parents decide appropriate rewards and punishments for 
their children, employers resolve disputes between employees or with their cus-
tomers, health maintenance organizations decide how to spend limited financial 
resources to try to obtain the best overall results for their covered enrollees (usu-
ally while attempting to maintain profitability), federal, state and local govern-
ments make resource allocation determinations, and so forth. Procedural and dis-
tributive justice principles, and possibly even restorative and retributive justice 
principles, are implicated in all of these instances, and thus provide fertile ground 
for future inquiry by behavioral science researchers interested in expanding their 
research outside of the courtroom context. 
In conclusion, while government, business, education, and many other spheres 
of civil society that raise justice concerns touch on the law and are impacted by 
the courts, they nonetheless operate primarily outside the litigation context, exer-
cising enormous influence on human behavior. Psycholegal scholars should con-
sider devoting more time and resources to studying justice issues in these con-
texts. We have long known the threat of judge or jury decision-making facilitates 
dispute resolution (e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979), but we know much less 
about why it is the case that the vast majority of disputes are resolved without 
any recourse to the formal legal system. There is much to know. Whether the 
matter is as potentially mundane as teenager compliance with school rules, as na-
tionally imperative as health care or economic reforms (e.g., Smith & Tyler, 1996), 
or as wrenching as the debate about the appropriate forums to resolve claims and 
the compensation amounts to be paid to the victims of the September 11th terror-
ist attacks (e.g., Bornstein & Poser, in press; Tyler & Thorisdottir, 2003), justice 
constructs can assist in social scientific understanding of the vast array of differ-
ences that arise in modern-day, diverse civil society (e.g., Tyler, 1994a, 2000; Ty-
ler, Lind, & Huo, 2000). 
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